Fordyce v Musick, 800 P.2d 1045 (Mont. 1990) (illegal listing of leased land in the state pension program) Text El Tejon Cattle Co. v. San Diego Cnty., 413 P.2d 146 (Cal. 1966) (if land held under a grazing lease was exempt from tax) Text Rucker v. Killian, No. 08-00-00015-CV, 2001 WL 121945 (Tex. App. October 11, 2001) (Landlords` Claims for Unpaid Rent, conversion and trespassing against former farm tenants) Schuler-Olsen Ranches, Inc. v. Garvin, 250 N.W.2d 906 (Neb.
1977) (Rights of the land purchaser on crops grown on agricultural leases) Text Roman Catholic Bishop v. Dep`t of Dep`t of Dep`t of Revenu, 1981 WL 2276 (or T.C. 1981) (if the Church can claim a tax exemption on Church property leased as farmland) The real estate mortgage creates a lien on the property; No title transferred. The plaintiff owned commercial real estate whose ownership was subordinated to debts evidenced by a promissory note secured by a mortgage on the property. The defendant acquired the mortgage at which point the plaintiff was in default of payment of the terms of the mortgage. The defendant then took possession of the property without informing the plaintiff. The plaintiff objected and demanded the return of the property so that it could be rented to repay the debts. The defendant refused and attempted to rent the property. The defendant brought a mortgage enforcement action while in possession of the property, claiming that it had acquired ownership of the property.
The plaintiff filed a lawsuit and claimed that the defendant had unlawfully taken possession of the property prior to the enforcement order. The defendant argued that he had the right to take possession of it because the part of the appeal of the mortgage indicated that the lender could enter the premises without notice if the borrower defaulted. The trial court ruled in favour of the defendant and ruled that the mortgage remedy provision, the plaintiff`s default and the fact that the property was vacant allowed the defendant to take possession of it. The Court of Appeal set aside the court of first instance and ruled that the defendant`s recourse to the mortgage provisions was not based on state law and that the plaintiff had not expressly or implicitly consented to the defendant entering the property. The state Supreme Court upheld this, ruling that the defendant must first file his application for enforcement with the court of first instance and then file his appeals for default. The Supreme Court noted that State law provides that “in the absence of provisions to the contrary, the seizing of immovable property may retain possession of it”. K.S.A. 58-2301 Thus, the mortgage debtor had the right of possession even in the event of default. The defendant argued that the mortgage provisions were a provision contrary to the rule that mortgage debtors retain ownership.
However, the Supreme Court noted that previous jurisprudence had made it clear that the mortgage instrument alone is not able to give the explicit consent a lender needs to take possession of real estate prior to a valid court case. The Supreme Court also upheld the long-standing precedent that a real estate mortgage does not transfer title, but simply creates a lien on the pledged property. Fairfax Portfolio LLC v Carojoto LLC, No. 118.712, 2020 Kan. LEXIS 90 (Sup. Ct. Kan. September 11, 2020). Beard v. Am. Agency Life Ins. Co., 550 A.2d 677 (Md.
1988) (if the tenant had an insurable interest in the life of his landlord under state law) Text Fed. Land Bank of Omaha v. Lower, 421 N.W.2d 126 (Iowa 1988) (if the mortgage debtor must report to the mortgage debtor`s receiver for the rent resulting from the lease of the land, Texte Ruud v. Frandson, 704 N.W.2d 852 (N.D. 2005) (Exercise of the option to purchase arable land) Text Hess v. Jarboe, 443 P.2d 294 (Kan. 1968) (Eviction of arable land; Punitive Damages) Text In 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision in a civil lawsuit under the Clean Water Act (CWA) against Maui County. Maui County v.
Hawai`i Wildlife Fund, 140 p. Ct. 1462 (2020). The plaintiffs claimed that the Maui County Wastewater Recovery Plant released pollutants through groundwater into a navigable body of water in violation of the CWA. The court ruled that approval is required if the “functional equivalent of direct relief” is present and sent the case back for a new hearing. Southwest FS, Inc. v. Fisher, 401 N.W.2d 247 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986) (Priority of interest in the proceeds of the tenant`s harvest between the secured party and the owner) Text Belk v. Martin, 39 p.3d 592 (Idaho 2001) (Reform of written cash rent land lease) Text The court found that Monsanto and BASF did not form a joint venture because BASF did not have the same control over the agreement to develop a dicamba-resistant seed. In addition, there was sufficient evidence to establish “different levels of defect”.
As a result, the Eighth Circuit struck down the $60 million in punitive damages and sent the case back for a new lawsuit to determine punitive damages. The procedure for the assessment of agricultural properties is maintained. The plaintiff owned arable land and asserted that the defendant`s assessment table, which was used by the county auditors in the land assessment to determine whether the land was eligible for the GA Current Use Assessment (AGV), was invalid because it had been poorly developed and implemented. In particular, the applicant argued that the table listing the soil types and values per acre for each soil type did not distinguish three types of soil present on his farm according to whether they were drained or not. This occurred despite the fact that the table showed separate values for other drained and unwatered soils. The applicant argued that these types of land should be subject to a lower unit value and, therefore, that its property tax should be reduced. He also claimed that Ohio`s tax commissioner abused his discretion by not assuming separate values per acre for non-excluded versions of his soil types. The Tax Appeals Board (BTA) rejected the plaintiff`s argument and the state Supreme Court agreed. The State Supreme Court ruled that the difference in treatment of soil types showed the Commissioner`s exercise of judgment, which the court considered rational. The State Supreme Court ruled that it was not for the Commissioner to prove the relevance of the CAUV newspaper entry.
Rather, the onus was on the Grievor to prove that the Commissioner had abused his discretion. The Complainant did not do so. Johnson vs. McClain, no. 2020-0472, 2021 Ohio LEXIS 963 (OH Sup. Ct. May 18, 2021). Cent. S.D. Coop. Grazing Dist.
v Sec`y of Agric., 266 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2001) The defendants acquired land next to the plaintiff`s property, on which they built a house. The defendants had an investigation conducted, which revealed that their home was twenty-seven feet from the property line. This original investigation treated the applicant`s metal fence as a border. Nine years later, the plaintiff ordered an investigation that concluded that closure was not the true boundary and that the defendant`s house had entered the plaintiff`s property. A subsequent survey of the accused yielded the same result. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit to expel the defendants from the controversial 0.828 acre wing. The defendants argued that the plaintiff`s closure constituted a tolerance limit.
The applicant argued that the fence should never serve as a dividing line, but as a means of keeping his horses on his property for a period of two to three years. The trial court found that the defendants had proved ownership of the disputed 828-acre property. On appeal, the applicant argued that no limit had been set by tolerance. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that the parties had not mutually agreed on closure as a property line. The Court of Appeal held that an explicit agreement between the parties is not required and that implied consent can be established if a dividing line can be drawn from the conduct of the parties over a period of time.